This article presents the findings of a qualitative research project which aimed to map out the political evaluations and the social effects of the changing concept of family and the changing forms of family life. By interviewing political and economic decision-makers we intended to highlight the goals and the motives of the differenct family policy approaches, the characteristic features of the family concepts reflected by the policy-makers' decisions, as well as the relationship between state family policies and labor market policies on the one hand, and equal treatment expectations concerning both genders, on the other. On the basis of interviews conducted with ordinary people we examined how much people's lives are practically infuenced by the family policy measures introduced by the political and the economic decision makers. According to our findings the two different categories of respondents saw specific family policy issues in different ways -however, their interpretations of family policy as a whole were rather convergent. The importance of providing equality of opportunity for men and women, increasing the female employment rate, acknowledging the plurality of family lifestyles, reconciling work and family lifebeing European expectations as well as conditions of a worthy life -seemed to be overshadowed by the demographic issues of fertility and procreation.
various transformations, that is to say, the monoculture of the classic nuclear family was exchanged for a pluralism of diverse family forms. As female employment has gained ground, so the traditional roles of women and men have become debatable, and, -at least in part -lost their function in the division of the tasks of home-making, looking after children, as well as house work, between the genders. Increasing economic independence of women has enabled them to plan their own futures, whilst partner choice was less and less affected by viewpoints of material security that could previously only be achieved together with a man. For all this the feminist -and sexual -liberation movements provided the ideological background. In parallel with women gaining societal independence grave value changes took place: society became ever more individualistic, which often goes together with a preference of shorter-term benefit maximization also at the level of partner relations. Long-term individual planning became a more common phenomenon -for example the accent on individual career goals -alongside the emergence and maintenance of more superficial partner relations (Utasi 2004) . Additionally, the emergence of a more universal concept of family contributed to a critical approach to the problems of family life, for example greater attention devoted to the problem of violence within families as well as better understanding of phenomena particular to various ethnic groups that impact on family life.
Changes characterized by the phenomena that broadened the concept of family together with recognized demographic processes -ageing of the population and the decreasing number of children per family, the deferments of marriage and child bearing, the increase in the number of single-person households -affected the situation of families and the transformation of family roles in large measure, and -at least in certain instances -the considerations of family policy.
Our present writing derives from the results of recently conducted research. We wished to investigate the effects of changes in family forms on society, transforming labor divisions of families and their members in society, as well as charting attitudes towards various types of work and the quality of life by means of research based on interviews. Among the main questions there were those referring to the connections between the family and the welfare state and the transformation of gender roles in society. The gender dimension was given special attention in this research because international experience has shown that female reproductive function is not only the basis of female identity within the family, but is also a determining factor of women taking part in education and in the field of work, as well as fulfilling their roles in society in general.
In the course of this work we were therefore on the one hand seeking the answer to the question of how the changes in family forms and family life are challenging Hungarian decision makers: from the view of political and economic decision makers we wished to analyze the goals and reasons of family policy considerations based on various premises, the features of the concepts of family behind these decisions, as well as family policy as part of social policy and employment policy as a part of economic policy, with special attention to the question of legal equality between the sexes. On the other hand, from the side of families, we examined what the family and family life mean to whom, and to what extent political and economic measures influence these, as well as the lives of family members in practice.
While the rhetorical talk referring to "the family" has consistently been full of positive values for decades, both in the concepts of politicians and experts, the statistical-demographic data on the real lives of families have in the mean time continued to show trends which various authorities have long since interpreted as symptoms of crisis (Pongrácz 1999; Pongrácz and S. Molnár 1998) . The continuously decreasing number of children per family, the falling number of marriages contracted, cohabitation without marriage becoming a norm, the continuously high divorce trends, the increasing trends of single parent families as well as the rising trend of children born to unmarried parents all indicate that at the level of facts the concept of family is in transformation. Therefore, when we hear from the makers of scientific opinion (Pongrácz and S. Molnár 1997; S. Molnár 1999; S. Molnár 2001) and the "family-centric" rhetoric from various governments sounding off how the Hungarian population is so especially pro-family, it is hard to decide precisely which kinds and forms of family the population is so much in favor of.
Demographic projections show a view of the future of society in which the ratio of earners to dependents deteriorates to the extent that it can endanger the economic equilibrium. The reality of an ageing population which is also characteristic for our country gives governments of every color the urge to influence the expected tendencies. All this is overshadowed by the set of problems of societal inequality and ethnic-cultural dimensions within the Hungarian population, which are in the first place reflected in the diverging productivity of the various societal groups (Hablicsek 2000) . Family-policy measures and conceptions which transcend political rhetoric should therefore go beyond crisis management induced by the use of the -apparently static and very popular -normative concept of family and starting from the pluralism of family forms try to establish concord between the various real needs of families and the political measures aimed at families.
THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY ROLES
Changes in the position and opportunities of women in society have also played a very important role in the transformation of family forms and roles in Hungary. The state-socialist system was characterized by a "lopsided" form of female emancipation: "In work, education, culture, and even in politics women became (almost) equal, and could experience equality (almost). However, in private life, in partner relationships, within the family, and furthermore generally in interpersonal relations (also in public life) the traditional configuration of the roles of men and women remained largely unchanged" (Ferge 1999: 17) . The socialist modernization as well as life in the apartment blocks of the cities and the use of nurseries, play schools and other free family-assisting state provisions forced the dual earning nuclear family model onto women -and onto men. At the same time there was a kind of nostalgic wish for a return to the era characterized by life within traditional family frames in which the husband maintains the family and the wife can be occupied with home making and bringing up the children (Neményi 1996) . The first government after the system change started to idealize the single earner traditional family model anew, yet the economic transformations obviously played a larger role in the revival of this family model than any political preferences.
Compared with the 1980s the number of Hungarian women who thought that a mother -particularly when her children are small -should be at home grew by the mid 1990s (Tóth 1995) . To understand exactly what caused this change in the attitudes of women, several factors have to be taken into consideration: besides the effects of new, or rather, renewed ideologies and traditional approaches the retreat of the state from welfare provisions can be mentioned as a particularly important aspect (Ferge 1999) , which could also have contributed to the weakened "attraction" of women's employment.
The central question of family-policy measures in Western-and Northern Europe is how to help child raising parents (both single parents and couples) reconcile their work with their family lives. In these professional and political discourses the topic of female employment appears as the most important factor influencing family life. The rising level of women's qualifications and their professional ambitions has become more and more determining factors in Hungary as well (Nagy 1999; Konz 2005) . Besides the requirements and expectations of the European Union, the ever broader career possibilities of women are explained by the fact that while the proportion of women employees on the labour market fell compared with the previous era, economically active Hungarian women are ever better qualified. As a result of this the number of women in leading positions is growing and their earnings are catching up with those of men, though in 2002 in Hungary the average income of women was still only 87% of that of men (Bukodi et al. 2004: 116) .
In connection with the rise of the level women's qualifications ever more women conceive of taking up work, beyond the practical necessity of earning money, as an option of self-realization, so for them the conservative governments' ideological messages -of the 'home building instead of paid work' type -do not mean too much. Demographic data appear to support the thesis that women want work and family -but first work and then family. Deliberate childlessness is a relatively new phenomenon in Hungary, which can reflect both the strengthening tendencies of individualization as well as the perceived and actual difficulties of the reconciliation of family life and employment. Among the factors inhibiting any increase in the number of children born is the deteriorating material situation, which, according to previous research results, can affect the value in real terms of family support and its selective character (Vukovich and Harcsa 2002) . Between 1991 and 2001 the number of households with children living in poverty grew the most in proportion to the total populationparticularly those bringing up at least three children -, while single-person households and couples without children enjoyed the highest levels of income (Gábos and Szivós 2002) .
The most common family form has remained the married couple with two children. However, between 1980 and 2001 the married proportion of the population older than 15 decreased from 67% to 52% (in the case of men from 71% to 56%, in that of women from 64% to 50%), while at the same time the ratio of divorcees almost doubled, and the number of those living alone rose from 18% to 28% (single men from 22% to 33%, single women from 14% to 22%, KSH 2001: 13) . In 2001 30% of children were born out of wedlock (Vukovich 2002: 140) . After reviewing all these changes, it can be said that while family life and its connection with politics changed in large measure since the system change, considering the previously generous state support and the measure of direct state control, a more rigorously realistic family policy did not emerge in the light of the manifold family forms that are found in contemporary Hungarian society.
OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVES OF FAMILY POLICY THINKING EXPRESSED BY DECISION MAKERS
In the first phase of our empirical research we sought to answer the question of what challenges are faced by Hungarian decision makers due to changes in family forms and family life. Thirty selected interviewees, politicians, economic actors, and leaders of NGOs, whom we chose because their activities were connected to the research topic, that is, family in relation to family policy The three categories of interviewees were in roughly equal proportion. The majority of politicians were (government and opposition) parliamentary representatives, local government or ministerial officials (secretaries of state, heads of department).Economic life was represented by trade union leaders and the human resources managers of companies, while mainly leaders of women's organizations spoke on behalf of NGOs.
The first round of questions referred to the legitimacy of family policy. In this context the majority of respondents were of the opinion that the government has only a limited right to intervene in family life in response to observed changes. Governmental and coalition political actors alike expressed themselves carefully: they stated that they only wished to influence the dynamic of family structure in such a way that the support of families with children is strengthened. However, NGO and trade union representatives typically criticized the lack of practical solutions in the theoretically always very child-friendly conceptions of governments of all colors, as they pointed to the often poorly considered coherence of family policy: In the past one and a half decades the various government measures have, in part purposefully, in part as a result of measures in other areas, intervened in the lives of families: this intervention is judged differently by government and opposition actors. The first socialist-liberal government with their economic stabilization program reduced the support of families with children, while the following conservative government -self-professedly strongly family-party -extended the support system. At the same time, this later extension meant a transformation of the system which went hand in hand with an increase in inequality. At the time our interviews were conducted the new kinds of family-policy conceptions of the socialist-liberal government in power at the time of this research were only at the rhetorical stage and thus the respondents expressed themselves in the light of the above dichotomy:
The previous government strengthened an exceedingly The second important question area of the interviews refers to whether the state can prefer certain forms of family. The central question of the debate turned out to be whether the government is entitled to differentiate between children on the basis of the "worth" of their parents or according to their way of living together. In the course of their elucidation of the diverging viewpoints on this almost all respondents referred to the demographic effects of family support, the stimulating, or on the contrary hindering, consequences on employment uptake, studiously mentioning the relation between the Roma population and having children.
Several of our interviewees expressed criticism of how the previous government preferred middle class families with multiple children to families of the poorer strata, as well as of the way that it fiscally favored those living in married families as opposed to statistically less enduring single-parent and unmarried families. Although the politicians of the present government coalition appeared more open to alternatives to marriage, the political will to support such family forms has not yet been expressed. The examination of the conceptions, goals, and justifications of family models brought up serious contradictions -not only among politicians of various streams, but also between politicians and societal actors -in the judgement of the necessity of treating the selected family model as the norm. A typical opposition political opinion contrasted the ideal family model to be preferred by government with "bad examples" from society: The questions of equal opportunities for men and women, the treatment of women as second rate employees, and the possibility of the reconciliation of family and career were deemed important problems by all three types of our respondents:
There are some housewives who rate their chances in the labor market so low that they will never be able to get a job. The stimulation of part-time, and other kinds of atypical employment of womenfor the time being typically not yet of men -often come up as possible solutions to the harmonization of work and family life. However, in the present situation of the Hungarian labor market the possible advantages for employees of part-time employment are less marked than the often experienced disadvantages: The majority of our interviewees are of the opinion that the issues relating to the establishment of equal opportunities have had attention mainly in theory. For the time being it seems that the related questions are being expressed politically, whilst practical measures to deal with the problem are being awaited: The topic of equal opportunities arose in all three categories of those questioned and the ethnic dimension that is to say in the Hungarian context, the question of support for Gypsy families appeared more important than regional differences or the nuances between the various societal strata: Most of our interviewees referred to Roma people in the context of the situation of their families -unschooled, disadvantageous regional location, burdened with unemployment, many children -and in that the policy of governments of any color ought to avoid further marginalization of these families. The representatives of NGOs were of the view that they could only have a limited impact on this problem with their own activities and that they could only exercise modest influence on the government: On the basis of the opinions of our respondents we reached the conclusion that some governmental family policy can be considered to have the hidden goal to support those social groups whose members' schooling, share of employment in society, and their capacity to look after themselves provide them with good chances to maintain an economic balance as opposed to those families which can be expected to remain dependent on social provisions. The question of whether focusing on the family is in itself of any value in the eyes of public opinion, the population, professionals and political decision makers, that is, whether some kind of selection, or double standard in the evaluation of certain kinds of family forms and family lifestyles within the compass of governmental family politics makes any sense in practice therefore seems to warrant further investigation.
In the course of the interviews we raised the question whether joining the European Union would be of influence on Hungarian family politics. It occurred several times, that European common directives were referred to in the interviews, but government actors, opposition politicians and the economic and NGO actors all regarded the directives as not really being in the forefront or that they saw any steps taken toward equality as cosmetic: At the same time, representatives of trade unions and NGOs strongly criticized the treatment of the question of equal opportunities for men and women as part of general equal opportunity policy by governments of all colors, that is, the governments did not, and do not wish to stress the extreme importance of women's policy and equal opportunities for women. As an example of this the Equal Opportunities Act passed in 2003 was referred to, within which, according to several of our interviewees, the mutually dissimilar grievances of the women's question, the disabled, and the Roma are dealt with in the same manner and not at all efficiently.
Here [in Hungary] a law appeared, like a lightning bolt under a clear sky, and that is an all-encompassing law. We say that we don't think it suitable, because this law deals with very much indeed, but unfortunately nothing will come of it properly. (A trade union women's branch representative)
Finally we have to mention a question about which our respondents of all three categories were of similar opinion, namely that criticism could be found in the interviews that the results of scientific research are not properly taken into account by politics and if at all, then at the most in a way that governments of every color use expert opinions to justify themselves. At the same time, however -particularly in NGO circles -the lack, and future necessity of impact reports about the effects on families of political decisions, whether aimed directly at families or indirectly affecting families was spoken about.
FAMILY LIFE IN PRACTICE
In the second phase of our empirical investigation we turned our attention to families and sought answers to the questions of what the family and family life mean to whom, and what is their significance -as well as family members' lives in practiceand to what extent these are affected by the political and economic decisions relating to families. Although generalized conclusions can hardly be drawn from our interviews, the application of a semi-structured interview method concentrating on "typical cases" yielded a dataset on the basis of which we were able to construct a view about how various political measures and messages influenced the family life of persons fulfilling diverse roles in families in differing circumstances. We put together the sample of eighty persons in such a way, that where possible, the interviewees would proportionally cover the possible types of family found in Hungarian society. We took domicile, family state, age, education and socio-economic status into account when selecting the interviewees, as well as making sure that the bulk of the roughly equal number of women and men respondents had at least one or two decades of their own family experience. From our aspiration to present (family) diversity it followed that we did not consider it possible to divide the sample according to the various aspects. At the same time three aspects could be brought forward, which generally appeared to be of characteristic effect during the processing of our data: the approach and reference to the system changes; the aspects of age (somewhat related to the former); as well as the sex of the respondents: (
iii) We would elevate a third aspect besides system changes and age, namely that of sex. Regardless of whether we are speaking of older or younger people, almost across our entire sample the life paths of men and women differ significantly and in large measure from each other. It was true for our respondents, both those living in traditional families, and those who live in other alternative forms of family, that at every turn the differences due to their roles as men or women were decisive on all areas determining their lives, that is career choice, taking employment, child rearing, in the field of reconciling family and work, as well as in the attention to contact between generations.
In summary it can be said that our interviewees (who made statements about their own family lives) in contrast to the previously examined opinion of political, economic, and societal actors, showed much less interest in the family-policy considerations, goals, and reasons of governments of every color, and much rather expressed practical criticism in connection with how the state could help its citizens in the solution of the problems of family life. Our respondents rejected almost en bloc the notion that politics should interfere in family life: here however, political statements of parties diverged from the judgement of the need of the role of the state independent from party politics. Several questioned the validity of the proposition that the family should become a more efficient political entity: According to most of our respondents family-policy issues only gain attention during election campaigns because "everyone wants to bribe families so that they will vote for them" (man aged 54). Party-political messages focusing on family issues did not gain favorable acceptance in general, presumably mainly in the circles of those who did not wish, or could not comply with the preferences expressed in those messages: Many were of the opinion that NGOs are more suited to represent the interests of families than politicians, more precisely certain forms of families with their own particular kinds of problems: in their view these well founded, -in many cases based on personal experience -grass roots initiatives are not yet disconnected from the people so they can deal with the problems more practically.
Nevertheless, for the time being the ability of NGOs to realize these interests seemed to be limited: 
Couples starting a new family are in a very hard situation, even more so if there is no help from parents or relatives, then it is very difficult for them to start their lives. It is also difficult that those who don't know the laws, for example, the regulations, can't get to the stage where they can claim their support. (A man aged 35)
A number of responses found connection between fleeting family policy and the uncertainty brought about by changes in the broader socio-economic environment. In this context the role of the state was primarily conceived as a moderator of social insecurity. To this end many mentioned the reduction of unemployment, creation of workplaces, as well as the development of the necessary capacities to re-socialize the post-system change market economy as means to alleviate social insecurity:
We grew up in the old communist system; we were not prepared for having to take care of everything for ourselves. This is why the changes were very hard on us: they ( On the one hand, there is a tendency to ward off the direct connection between the state -that is, politics -and personal decisions, a phenomenon mentioned in the results of previous research (Neményi 2003) ; on the other hand there is dissatisfaction with the amounts of benefit and how they are shared out. Some criticism of the theory and practice of the distribution of benefit was colored by mention of "the minority who give birth because of child support" (Hungarian Roma), which can be related to the also well documented approach "In Hungary not those breed who ought to" (Neményi 2003) :
The way I see it is that in very many cases the so-called minority claims these benefits, and I claim household support as well so that is not just they who get it. Though there are a lot of people who would be entitled to it, but they don't bother to claim. However, the minority who has x number of children, I think that is why they have children, so they can claim family support and the like. I don't think those get it that ought to, but those who perhaps only have children so that they can claim. (A woman aged 29)
Amounts awarded under family policy provisions were considered unrealistically low by almost all involved. There were those who compared the tight material support with denigrating alms or charity: (A man aged 27) The statements of interviewees markedly showed that material interests have but a limited influence on decisions in connection with family life. Almost everyone rejected the notion that material considerations play a general role in the choice of whether to have children. At the same time, several mentioned in connection with the births of their own children that while for the first one or two this did not in general play a role, material concerns did arise in connection with the birth of more childrenat least at the level of fear of a more difficult subsistence: Our respondents were quite clear about the material sacrifices that go with having children, which the majority accepted as a natural thing that goes with that. The financial responsibility of bringing up children forced the satisfaction of personal needs into the background, mainly among the older generation: The spread of the "single lifestyle" mentioned by one of our interviewees -which in the words of Ágnes Utasi is "the lifestyle of single young people without permanent relationship, competitive in the labor market, active at work and leisure, with a good standard of living" (2004: 15) -can be connected to increasing individualism and the changes in value preferences that go with that, while at the same time in the context of the examination of forms of family life it can be seen as a symptom that the dilemma "family or career" can not be solved by the -not so -young people looking to establish a family.
The possibility of harmonising family life and work -or, in certain cases, rather the impossibility -appeared as one of the most important aspects in our research. Our respondents, almost without exception referred to this topic, yet for the vast majority of both female and male respondents this appeared as a particularly female problem, which must be faced mainly, but not exclusively by women.
We analyzed the answers referring to women with the help of the types of female work and family life preferences used by Catherine Hakim (2000) . The three categories are the adaptive, the work-centered, and the home-centered woman. For the adaptive woman work and family are both important and neither is given priority in life all the time. Most women can be placed into this category. Occupations that foster the reconciliation of work and family life -for example, careers in teaching -are particularly attractive to these women. A large proportion of women who take on part-time work after having children are in this group. We found instances of the adaptive woman's preference type among our Hungarian respondents: Work-centered women are in a minority, despite the fact that there have been more women with tertiary qualifications in the past few decades, and more women have been working in higher management as well. The work-centered person -men as well as women -like to take part in competitions in public life: career building, sport, political and cultural activities. Their family lives are subordinate to their work and many -even among those who are married -will have no children. They regard gaining qualifications as an investment toward their careers, rather than a safeguard for their living as is characteristic for the adaptive group. The majority of men can be placed in the work-centered group, while only about 20% of women are in this category. Among our female Hungarian respondents we found no preferences characteristic of work-centered women, but there are two opinions of men that fit: The third group is made up of home-centered women, who are also in a minority as opposed to the adaptive women: moreover, since politics and media these days mainly focus on the problems of working women, this group appears to be completely invisible at times. Home-centered women place their private lives and their families before their work from the time they are married. They are more inclined to live in large families and leave their work after marriage if the family can afford that. Gaining qualifications is not an unimportant concern within this group either, especially considering that educational institutions can serve them not only with education, but also with a promising terrain for finding a partner. According to Hakim their share of society is about 20%, similar to the work-centered group. Among our interviewees we can quote from several women -older and younger -who can be characterized as having home-centered preferences: Assistance in reconciling employment and family commitments is of great importance taking into account the work-and family life style preferences. On the basis of their own experiences, our respondents mentioned family -typically grand parental -and external, paid help in regard of child minding. Our interviewees did not speak of day care provided by the state or the workplace. This can be explained -also based on the results of previous research -, on the one hand, because the state institutions ensuring child day care (nurseries, play schools) are still "there for everyone", whose basic importance will only become salient after they will have been abolished (Neményi 2003) . Hence, it can be said, that there is state assistance in organizing child day care -although, for example 90% of nurseries are in Budapest and the larger towns (Frey 2002: 423) -, but perhaps people are not conscious of this form of help because it "goes without saying" that it should be there. On the other hand, however, no -or hardly any -such help could be detected on the part of employers. Flexible and part-time work, as well as family-friendly workplaces permitting family absence, or working from home are rare in Hungary today, yet according to the data of research done in 2002 the greatest help in reconciling family commitments with employment to the majority of those at home with children under three on child care allowance would be flexible work (Frey 2002) .
The harmonization of work and family life is closely interrelated to the question of the division of work within the family. "Real work" is still defined as paid work by most people, so housework is often only appreciated as an important activity when it is not done: An older respondent also pointed out that at the beginning of relationships and marriages the partners are keener to do more housework together as they wish to spend more time together for example to go out. Later however, -particularly after the birth of (a) child(ren) -the situation changes. One typical form of family work-sharing model that emerged from the answers of our respondents was that of the home-making woman and the working man:
The Considering the topic of sharing of housework it can be said that the majority of our respondents saw this as an issue within the nuclear family. An intergenerational division of work came up mainly in the area of looking after small children in the form of -gladly accepted, but no longer taken for granted -grandparental help. There was little mention of the care of family members who are older, ill, or otherwise in need of care, yet previous examinations of those on child care allowances show that for a good majority the reconciliation of work and family commitments was not only problematic because there was no child care, but also because they had no other way of solving the problem of caring for a dependent adult (Frey 2002: 413) .
The "under-representation" of the importance of inter-generational help provision can be explained by the fact that for our respondents the concept of family rarely contained the family form characterized by several generations living together: thus family members physically living away from the nucleus of the family could count less on practical family solidarity in terms of looking after adults needing care. Typically the majority of our interviewees mainly spoke of the disadvantages of several generations living together: In the course of our investigation in parallel with the changes narrowing the concept of family from certain points of view we were able to witness the emergence of a broader understanding of the idea of family. A middle-aged divorced woman bringing up her own larger and an adopted younger child deemed her own "irregular" family ideal while she considered that the traditional family solidarity was replaced by help offered by friends:
It is an interesting thing that many these days
Personally I am not ill content with my own family, because the one mother, one larger child and small child seems to be ideal -at least I don't think that just because something is completely standard it would work better. To me, this is also a family. The circle of friends is able to help much better than a bad family. (A woman aged 53)
CONCLUSION
The two kinds of respondents in the interviews constituting the basis of this studyrepresentatives of family political formations and members of varying forms of real extant families -approached the questions we put to them in appropriately different ways. At the same time, -if not in accent, but in regard to the relevance of several issues -we find similar interpretations of all of family-politics in the two sets of interviews. It stands out that the family means family with children on both sides and that the concept of family policy is subordinated to demographic issues. The equality of men and women, the recognition of, or resistance to the changes in family forms, the reconciliation of family and work issues, the stimulation of women's employment rates in line with European expectations, and in addition as an important precondition of worthy co-equal life, are mostly expressed in the dimension of having children. Compared with the normative but often sharply contradictory opinions of the "elite" interviews, the "lay" interviews all in all suggest the view that politics must not interfere in personal decisions about having children -but any government has the duty to ensure the material preconditions of the functioning of families. This, however, means in the first place that there should be employment opportunity, proper child day care institutions, provisions tailored to real needs, and family-friendly workplaces, which make autonomous decisions by men and women possible, and not a proactive policy which in given circumstances encroaches on individual freedom.
At the same time, in line with the results of international research, it appears that it is difficult to conciliate the real practices of family life in Hungary with family-connected normative political concepts whose premise is what families should be like and not how they actually work (Silva -Smart 1999) . As one of our respondents, an NGO representative put it: the task of the state is that "it puts up with its citizens, and supports them". In order for citizens to decide for themselves how they wish to live, and in order to prevent decision makers and public opinion, driven by politics and media, from regarding change in itself as dangerous and undesirable, we ought to know more about the real workings of families. We can only hope that research of family sociology can have a role in revealing the true variety of family forms and the changeability in the forms of family life, and that it can raise the awareness of opinion and decision makers as well.
